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NOTE
ALIMONY DECREES AVAILABLE MEANS OF
ENFORCEMENT IN KENTUCKY
At common law a court of equity had two methods of en-
forcing alimony decrees. One method was by the writ of at-
tachment of the person of the defaulting husband, under which
he was cited as being in contempt of court and imprisoned until
such a time as he had purged himself of his contempt by pay-
ment of the alimony then due under the decree.1 This means
of enforcement was resorted to practically to the exclusion of
the second method, the writ of sequestration. 2 By means of
this writ the courts of equity were given the power to take
charge of the husband's property, both real and personal, and
administer it for the benefit of the wife, to the extent of her
claim derived from the alimony decree. The court could col-
lect the rents and profits from the defaulting husband's lands.
as well as the income from his personalty, or it could sell his
personalty, and apply the proceeds to the payments due under
the alimony decree.
With such an effective means of enforcement as was made
available by the writ of sequestration, one might well question
the advisability of so frequent resort by the common law courts
to imprisonment for contempt in order to enforce payment of
alimony. If such a question is justified in regard to the action
of the common law courts it would appear that it is all the more
justified as regards the Kentucky courts of today, in view of the
ample means of enforcement, other than by imprisonment, now
available in this jurisdiction.
In 1893, Kentucky passed what is now Kentucky Revised
Statutes Section 426.430, which provides: "A final order or
judgment in equity for money, land or other specific thing may
be enforced by any appropriate writ of execution, allowable on a
judgment at law, or by the ancient practice of courts of
chancery. The writ shall issue and be returnable as other
writs of execution. "3
INotes (1920) (Introduction) 8 A. L. R. 1156, (1911) 137 Am. St.
Rep. 876, (1894) 24 L. R. A. 433.2 Notes (1925) 38 A. L. R. 1084, (1889) 1 L. R. A. 788, 10 R. C. L.
565, (1896) 24 Eng. Ru. Ca. 40.
* 1893, c. 219, p. 1004, Art. V, sec. 1.
NoTE
As will be noted from its wording the legislature did not
intend this statute as a substitution for the common law powers
of a court of equity, but rather as an addition to them.
Although the courts appear generally to have ignored the
increased powers made available by this statute, a study of the
cases arising since the date of its passage reveals that its pro-
visions have been resorted to in a number of instances. One of
the first decisions to take advantage of its existence was that
of Tyler v. Tyler,4 where the wife was granted alimony in a
lump sum, and the court held that equity could order execu-
tion by sale of the former husband's realty. The court also
pointed out that the alimony judgment made the wife just like
any other judgment creditor of the husband and the alimony
due became a debt of record upon which execution would is-
sue.
Since the decision in the above case the Kentucky courts
have resorted to various means of securing payment of alimony.
In addition to granting execution upon realty,5 execution has
been ordered upon personalty,6 garnishment of the former hus-
band's income has been permitted,7 his bank account has been
attached,8 and notes owned by the husband have been ordered
collected and the proceeds paid into court. 9 To assure com-
pliance with any alimony decree it might later grant, courts
have permitted the wife to attach her husband's property upon
filing her petition for divorce.10
In Nisbet's Ex'rs. v. Nisbet,1i the wife sued the husband
for alimony and joined as defendants the executors of the
499 Ky. 31, 34 S. W. 898- (1896).
'Ferree v. Ferree, 285 Ky. 825, 149 S. W. 2d 719 (1941); Harley
v. Harley, 283 Ky. 725, 142 S. W. 2d 992 (1940); Tyler v. Tyler, 99
Ky. 31, 34 S. W. 898 (1896); see Ford v. Ford, 230 Ky. 56, 18 S. W. 2d
859 (1929); Franck v. Franck, 107 Ky. 362, 54 S. W. 195 (1899).
*Ferree v. Ferree, 285 Ky. 825, 149 S. W. 2d 719 (1941); see
Ford v. Ford, 230 Ky. 56, 18 S. W. 2d 859 (1929);,Tyler v. Tyler, 99
Ky. 31, 34 S. W. 898 (1896).
Coggins v. Coggins, 289 Ky. 570, 159 S. W. 2d 4 (1942); see
Nisbet's Ex'rs v. Nisbet, 178 Ky. 456, 198 S. W. 1154 (1917).
'Adkins v. Adkins, 213 Ky. 100, 280 S. W. 477 (1926) (the court
ordered that the funds be applied to payment of the wife's attorney's
fees and costs, but nothing appears which would have prevented
their being applied to satisfy the alimony claim).
'Adkins v. Adkins, 213 Ky. 100, 280 S. W. 477 (1926).
'*Ferree v. Ferree, 285 Ky. 825, 149 S. W. 2d 719 (1941); Adkins
v. Adkins, 213 Ky. 100, 280 S. W. 477 (1926).
'178 Ky. 456, 198 S. W. 1154 (1917).
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estate of the husband's deceased father. It was held that the
wife was'entitled to a full disclosure by such executors as to
the amount and character of the husband's inheritance, with a
view to ascertaining the portion thereof that might be applied
toward the payment of alimony.
In the case of Ferree v. Ferree,12 the equity court went so
far as to order that a lien attach to the husband's lands to
secure the payment of alimony, but it does not appear whether
the lien was made a part of the alimony decree or was ordered
in a subsequent suit by the wife to enforce the decree. How-
ever, the decision in Campbell v. Trosper,3 by dictum, points
out that the Chancellor can provide for such a lien in his ali-
mony decree.
Still another recourse open to a court of equity may be
found where the husband is the beneficiary of a trust estab-
lished for his support. In the case of Ford v. Ford,14 the hus-
band's father had set up a trust for his son's benefit, and the
court decreed that the trustee might be directed to pay a cer-
tain amount out of the proceeds of such trust for the support
of the husband's children. This case serves to show that the
court of equity may take charge of the proceeds payable out of
a trust fund if a sufficiently equitable claim arises, and that.
if the proper circumstances exist those proceeds may be applied
to the satisfaction of an alimony decree. This result was
reached in a well known New York case.' 5
Under the present status of the law in Kentucky there ap-
pears to be only one type of alimony decree that cannot be en-
forced by any and all of the above named means, and that is
the temporary support allowed the wife during the process of
the suit for divorce. Such a decree is not regarded as a final
judgment and therefore is enforceable by rule only.16 All other
types of alimony, whether lump sum, settlement agreement, or
that payable in a monthly amount until further order of the
court, are considered as final judgments, upon which execution
may issue as to the amount due.
In view of the virtually unlimited resources available to
285 Ky. 825, 149 S. W. 2d 719 (1941).
108 Ky. 608, 57 S. W. 245 (1900).14230 Ky. 56, 18 S. W. 2d 859 (1929).
'Wetmore v. Wetmore, 149 N. Y. 520, 44 N. E. 169 (1896).
'Ford v. Ford, 230 Ky. 56, 18 S. W. 2d 859 (1929).
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a court of equity to enforce payment of alimony, it is difficult
to comprehend why resort should so frequently be had by
Chancellors to imprisonment. It is within the discretion of the
court as to whether or not a request by the wife to have her
defaulting- husband imprisoned shall be granted.17 But a wise
court should compel her first to seek relief by means of some
one of the above methods. It is contended that the courts are
entirely too prone to seek the easiest way out and relieve them-
selves and the wife of slight difficulties at the expense of the
reputation, liberty and good name of the husband.
CARLETON Al. DAVIs
1 TBarrett v. Barrett, 287 Ky. 216, 152 S. W. 2d 610 (1941).
